The existence of God as demonstrated from motion has preoccupied men in every age, and still stands as one of the critical questions of philosophic inquiry. The four thinkers Father Buckley discusses were selected because their methods of reasoning exhibit sharp contrasts when they are juxtaposed. Originally published in 1971. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original (...) texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

The university as the pluralistic forum is not a picture of what a Catholic university is but a picture of what it is gradually, painfully becoming.

Roger Haight's Christology is an instance of distinctively modern Vermittlungstheologie, to be distinguished from biblical or traditional versions of mediation because it employs an apologetic method to restore putatively lost Christological immediacies. In so far as such a theology seek to communicate Christian doctrine “in a language of commonly shared principles”, it cannot do justice to Jesus Christ's singularity—although the best way to further criticize any mediating Christology would be by developing an alternative neither traditionalist, modernist, or mediating.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS Unbaptized God. The Basic Flaw in Ecumenical Theology. By ROBERT W. JENSON. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992. Pp. v + 152. $16.95 (paper). The thesis of this potentially revolutionary book is nicely summarized in its title: the basic flaw in ecumenical theology is the unbaptized-that is, insufficiently trinitarian-God of Christians East and West, Protestant and Catholic. The book is revolutionary because it proposes a new way of reading (...) the logic of a myriad of ecumenical dialogues over the last quarter century; as a result, ecumenical theology and praotice for which God is among the " settled " issues ought be appropriately chastised by this book. But I think that Unbaptized God is only "potentially " revolutionary because I think Jenson leaves two crucial questions unanswered. Jenson's daring argument is made with rare clarity and compactness. Consider the argument in three stages. First, in an introduction, Jenson describes " the frustration of dialogue." He does not mean the frustration created by the meager knowledge or acceptance of the results of ecumenical dialogues on the popular level-or the reception without action of these results by Church officials (p. 2). He focuses on " a third mode of frustration ": a dialogue will proceed toward a " convergence," not without "tolerable divergence "; but the initially tolerable divergence eventually yields " a newly virulent division." The process is seemingly "circular" (p. 3). "No set of convergences ever seems to be enough, once the separations are there " (p. 4). Why? And what can be done about this? Second, Jenson illustrates the frustration and starts showing the way beyond it in several different ways. He describes the dialogues in the first two parts of the book. In Part One, Jenson takes up "The Early Ecumenical Convergences " on issues central to the sixteenth century reformations, Ca.tholic and Protestant: Justification (ch. 1), Real Presence (ch. 2), and Eucharistic Sacrifice (ch. 3). Part Two takes up Churchly Office (ch. 4), Episcopacy (ch. 5), Roman Primacy (ch. 6), and The Church's Mediation (ch. 7). The distinctions between the issues of Part One and Part Two seem to be both historical and logical. Historically, the issues of Part Two are what Walter Kasper called the surprising "displacement of the problematic" (p. 44) from issues 677 678 BOOK REVIEWS considered central by Trent and the Reformers (especially justification and the eucharist) to issues that emerged after the Reformation (especially ecclesiology). Logically, the distinction between Part One and Part Two is the distinction between the traditional matters of controversy (Part One) and what are claimed to be differences "hidden at some conceptual level deeper than that occupied by the traditional matters of controversy" (Part Two) (p. 7). I will not rehearse Jenson's splendid summaries of the many dialogues in English, French, and German (although the book ought be recommended on these grounds alone). The unofficial Groupe des Dombes is regularly regarded as the most ecumenically insightful, and the Dominican J. M. R. Tillard plays a particularly crucial role among Roman Catholic theologians. It is enough to say that Jenson successfully shows how each dialogue can be read as an instance of the frustration he initially mentioned: a " convergence " occurs on each topic which later turns into a " divergence " which later is converted into a " convergence " and so forth. By the end (ch. 7), everything seems to circle back to the doctrine of justification (ch. 1). But the appearances, Jenson argues, are deceiving. "The pattern of the dialogue's history proves to be more like a spiral than a circle on a plane" (p. 103). Thus, besides describing the dialogues, Jenson must also prove that the dialogues exhibit a non-circular movement. One of the fascinating features of Jenson's argument at this stage is that he does this in a slightly different way in each of the first seven chapters. For example, he sometimes clears away "illusory dissensus" (p. 22). He sometimes concludes that "the Catholic side is right." Indeed, the Catholic side seems right on most crucial issues-on convictions about the temporal constitution of persons that constitute the background for arguments over Real Presence (p. 32); on the "new" Catholic theology of eucharistic sacrifice (p. 41) ; on episcopal succession (p. 74... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A RETURN TO THE SUBJECT: THE THEOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHARLES TAYLOR'S SOURCES OF THE SELF JAMES J. BUCKLEY Loyola College Baltimore, Maryland ECENT THEOLOGIANS have widely argued (or pve-. sumed) that modernity's 1turn to the subject creates deep p11ohlems for imagining, thinking about, or enacting who we m'e. These theologians do not aJwaJ"s agree on what constitutes "modernity." And they ra11e!ly agree on the 'alternative to " the (...) turn to the :subject.'' That is, some theologians airgue or presume that the turn from the subject ought to he baiekwa:rid, retrieving our sou11ces prior to what Vatican II and others c:a:lrl "the modeTn world;" others argue o'l.' presume tha:t the turn ought be forwavd to "post-modernity," either accommodating ourseh11es to the decentered selves of the post-modern secular avant garde or proclaiming the strange, new wo1'1d of the Bible. Hut neo-Augustinians and Thomists, liberation theologians and pragmatists, Wittgensrteinians and Barthians all roughly agree (in spite of deep disagx,eements) that we need to turn from the subject;1 Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity is a massivie challenge to these presumptions and argument1s.2 It is, we might s'ay, a call to re-turn to the :subjeict-;hut quwlified this time by a gl'e3.1ter sense of this subject 'is historiml context in the Enlightenment and Romantioism 1 For a summary of critiques of different turns to the subject, see David H. Kelsey, "Human Being," in Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks, ed. Peter C. Hodgson and Robert H. King, Second Edition (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985 [Firnt Edition, 1982]), Chapter 6. 2 Charles Taylor Sources of the Sdf: The Making of the JJiodern Identity (Harvard University Press, 1989), referred to in the body of this essay by page numbers in parentheses. 497 498 JAMES J. BUCKLEY a1s weU.as this subject's constant ternptaition to undermine the very world it mak!es. A rea1der's response to the book wilil depend not only on how one rea1ds Taylor (e.g., does he under- or over-qualify his ca11 to return to Lhe subject?) but also on where the reader finds heriseilf on the tlieological spectrum. However, the fact that T.aylor',s book has been greeted with critical enthusiasm by both theologiical 'agnostics and contempomry Augustinians and Thomists suggests tha1t it is a book whose power and scope will resonabe with very different sort1s of men and women.3 My aim here is not to summarize or 1 assess the riches of this book. Soumes of the Self is a book of such clarity, power, and 1scope that lit will takce some 1 time for rea;ders (or, ak least, this reader) fo absorb it a;nd to respond :to Taylor adequateJy. My aim is much more modest, nameJy, to pursue some of the connections between Tayl:or's proposal and theology. These connections vv:i.11 suggest some chores Taylor has discoveil'ed or crea;ted for theoilogians. I rea:lize that I risk doing an injustice to a book by a philosopher, not a theologian. Tayfor is candid about hls own theologica1l convictions, while not pretending fully to ddend or evcen fully expl~ca:te those convictions. Nonetihe1ess, I wiill show tha:t his theses challenge n1any of us in ways tha:t justify a foous on theo1ogica,l isisues.Je objecition to. Tayloi; rightly speaks of the "anti-humanism of much evange[ieail rie~ ligion today," bu:t I be1ievie he is mistaken when he fails to 1.2 He carefully distinguishes neo-Nietzscheans like Lyotard, Derrida, and even Foucault, from Nietzsche himself, who had a kind of "saving inconsistency " (489) in his simultaneous affirmation and denial of a " sense of the magnificent, of the categorically affi.rmable, of the infinitely worthy of love " (453). ON CHARLES TAYLOR 509 qualify lthis "murch" and also when he caMs "figures like Cardina1l Ra:tzinger" anti-humanistic (318). He!thinks that abortion debrutes a're not so murch deep disagreements as they are exceptionail disagreements that only provie h0:w suhs1tantial our agreements are (515). But Taylor... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BALTHASAR'S USE OF THE THEOLOGY OF AQUINAS }AMES J. BUCKLEY Loyola College in Maryland Baltimore, Maryland T HE AIM OF THIS essay is to raise some questions about the internal consistency of Hans Urs von Balthasar's use of the theology of Thomas Aquinas. These are genuine questions. That is, they are not questions ("Is Balthasar's use of Aquinas consistent?") disguising or masking answers ("Balthasar's use of Aquinas is (...) inconsistent"). While I hope the questions set an agenda for disputations between students of these two theologians, my aim is not to settle the many disputations between the theologies of Aquinas and Balthasar, but to propose some quaestiones disputatae. In Balthasar's terms, the aim is to set up the theater and put some characters on the stage, not to stage the drama itself. Why bother? First, Balthasar's theology arises out of a tradition critical of the theology of Aquinas, and students of Aquinas can only ignore such objections at the price of abandoning Aquinas's habit of responding to such criticisms. The locus classicus of this critique is Balthasar's claim that he omits Aquinas from his canon of theological aestheticians because Aquinas is one of those whose "deep and lucid philosophical aesthetics" has "failed to achieve a theological translation, that is, to be seen as the unfolding of a theology based on biblical revelation" (GL II, 21).1 Thomas Aquinas (Balthasar later says) "was more of a philosopher than a theologian" (GL III, 9). We shall see later that ' I shall use the following abbreviations: ST = Summa Theologiae. Latin text and English translation, ed. Thomas Gilby, various translators (New York: McGraw-Hill; London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964-80). GL =The Glory ofthe Lord: A Theological Aesthetic, ed. Joseph Fessio, S.J., and John Riches, various translators, 7 vols. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press; New York: Crossroad Publications, 1982-91). 517 518 JAMES J. BUCKLEY Balthasar also mentions other objections to Aquinas. In fact, part of my argument will be that this central criticism of Thomas's aesthetics is intelligible only against the background of other even more important criticisms of Aquinas's theology. I ought also to note at this early stage, however, that Balthasar 's criticisms of Aquinas are almost always carefully qualified. For example, in the locus classicus just cited, Balthasar objects to Aquinas's aesthetics, not his ethics or metaphysics; indeed, it is a criticism of Aquinas's theological aesthetics, not his philosophical aesthetics. Still further, Balthasar even says it "would perhaps" be possible to develop the "implicit" theological aesthetics in Thomas's philosophical aesthetics; however, Balthasar (inexplicably, some would say at this point) thinks this could only be done "witn uncertain success" (GL II, 21). One reason for the frequent allusiveness of Balthasar's objections to Aquinas is a second reason for bothering with Balthasar's use of Aquinas: in and with the firmness of Balthasar 's criticisms of Aquinas, the vast majority of Balthasar's uses of Aquinas are constructive rather than critical. Indeed, if taking the measure of theological disputation were primarily a matter of weighing quotations, it could easily be shown that Balthasar's use of Aquinas is by far more positive than negative. More importantly, I shall propose that Balthasar notices features of Aquinas's theology not often noted (or still not noted often enough) by many students of Aquinas. This common ground between Balthasar and Aquinas recalls how, among Roman Catholics in the first part of this century, there was a sort of alliance among Catholic reformers-over against strains of Catholic traditionalisms-between some forms of Thomism and TD= Theodramatik, 4 vols. (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1973-83). T-D =Theo-drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, various translators, 5 vols. planned (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988-). TL= Theologik, 3 vols. (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1985-87). For a summary of Balthasar's trilogy on beauty and goodness and truth, see his Epilog (Einsiedeln/Trier: Johannes Verlag, 1987) as well as My Work: In Retrospect, trans. Cornelia CapoI (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993). BALTHASAR'S THEOLOGY OF AQUINAS 519 what was known as la nouvelle theologie (including Balthasar).2 It is this common ground that ought to make us wary of... (shrink)

Conventional wisdom holds that C. S. Lewis was uninterested in politics and public affairs. The conventional wisdom is wrong. As Justin Buckley Dyer and Micah J. Watson show in this groundbreaking work, Lewis was deeply interested in the fundamental truths and falsehoods about human nature and how these conceptions manifest themselves in the contested and turbulent public square. Ranging from the depths of Lewis' philosophical treatments of epistemology and moral pedagogy to practical considerations of morals legislation and responsible citizenship, (...) this book explores the contours of Lewis' multi-faceted Christian engagement with political philosophy generally and the natural-law tradition in particular. Drawing from the full range of Lewis' corpus and situating his thought in relationship to both ancient and modern seminal thinkers, C. S. Lewis on Politics and the Natural Law offers an unprecedented look at politics and political thought from the perspective of one of the twentieth century's most influential writers. (shrink)

In this study of Marshall’s Christology in Conflict, the author deals with three questions and issues which can be raised regarding Marshall’s argument: his account of the historical shape of the problem, his critique of Rahner, and his use of Barth’s christology.

David Kelsey's Eccentric Existence argues that what we need is a “systematically unsystematic” account of human existence, a set of “buoys” or non‐negotiable convictions articulated on the basis of canonical Scriptures, leaving abundant room for philosophers and other non‐theologians to make their contributions. Embodied persons themselves/ourselves are constituted in three irreducibly complex canonically biblical narratives as creatures, reconciled, and consummated—although it is not always clear what aspects of these narratives are “buoys” and which are more negotiable. The God who constitutes (...) embodied persons is the triune God of Nicaea who operates as one but in irreducibly distinct ways as Father and Son and Spirit—and cannot be mere instrument of human purposes. Kelsey intentionally leaves a number of Trinitarian and Christological questions open for further treatment, creating remarkable challenges for traditionalists and modernists alike. (shrink)

The Mandaean Book of John: Critical Edition, Translation and Commentary. Edited by Charles G. Häberl and James F. McGrath. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2020. Pp. vii + 467. $218.99.

One of the worst aspects of racism is the damage inflicted on the human person by evoking feelings of separateness and inferiority. In his Letter from Birmingham Jail, Martin Luther King meant to capture that impact by referring to a “degenerating sense of nobodiness.” This essay invokes King’s reference to “nobodiness” and connects it explicitly with the negative effects on three particular elements of the human person. Those are having a unique and expressive voice, living a narrative life, and being (...) a Thou. Each is part of a distinctive, unrepeatable personhood. Racism, however, with its categorizing and generalizing tendencies, denies the recognition of those attributes and thereby accords a status of “nobody” to the victim. His or her point of view, personal story, and capacity to stand with integrity as a Thou are set aside. Rendered a “nobody” by racism, his or her personhood has been denied. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS At the Origins of Modern Atheism. By MICHAEL J. BucKLEY, S.J. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987. Pp. viii+ 445. Writing ostensibly a history of the philosophical origins of 18th century atheism in 17th century theism, Michael Buckley, S.J., has contributed a learned, subtle, and provocative hook whose length is significantly increased and whose focus is considerably enlarged by a running commentary about (...) the metatheory (Richard McKeon's philosophical semantics) that structures his reading of the chosen theists and atheists. Buckley provides the best summary of his own historical conclusion: "... theology generated apologetic philosophy and philosophy generated Universal Mechanics, and these in turn co-opted theology to become the foundations of theistic assertions... [But] when the contradictions between Cartesian and Newtonian mechanics were further negated... god became a deus otiosus" [pp. 358-359]. This conclusion rests on a philosophical principle whose elements are taken from Plato's Seventh Epistle: " The name, the definition, and the instance for the atheistic negations are all set by the current theism " [p. 15]. In turn, this principle is justified by a cluster of meta-theses that are not easily summarized, although one stands above the rest: " Much more may he involved in such a process of ideas [from 17th century theism to 18th century atheism] than their· own internal necessity, hut internal necessity remains and governs inherently " [p. 334]. The latter meta-thesis asserts that there is a dialectic of ideas and it is from this point of view that Buckley reads the conceptual history of modern atheism. Dialectical necessity is a bugbear for many contemporary philosophers, hut Buckley argues, convincingly I think, that some kind of conceptual necessity links theism and atheism. Atheism is, essentially, the negation of a particular form of theism. In Hegelian terms, atheism is a determinate negation which draws all of its conceptual content from what it negates. Buckley, however, puts an even greater Hegelian spin on the same point. If the theism carries within itself a contradiction, it negates itself and, thereby, dialectically generates its contradiction-atheism [cf. p. 17]. " Modern atheism took not only its meaning hut its existence from the self-alienation of religion " [p. 359]. A theism that believes in the existence of an intelligent, personal God, Who creates and orders the universe, but that attempts a rational 144 BOOK REVIEWS 145 justification of this belief apart from the religious experience that alone can embody such a faith contains exactly the kind of inner contradiction that generates the negation of itself. Buckley focuses on the poignant contradiction of a Christian theology abandoning " the religious figure of Jesus as the principal evidence for the reality of God" [p. 41] in favor of some philosophy (whether that of Descartes, Malebranche, or Newton) which provides a different and allegedly more certain kind of evidence for God's existence. This theology, or more precisely the theistic philosophies it spawned, are the sources of modern atheism because, if Descartes and Newton are consistently combined, philosophy can do quite well without God. Laplace's famous reply to Napoleon, although it was not originally an atheistic slogan, captures what Diderot and d'Holbach thought: God is an unnecessary hypothesis in a truly universal mechanics which needs to presuppose only matter and motion. The historical story, of course, is more complicated than this skeleton dialectic can suggest. Buckley richly details the story but I shall rehearse only its opening chapter. Buckley begins with the Jesuit theologian, Leonard Lays (1554-1623), usually known under his Latin name, Lessius, whose De providentia numinis et anima immortalitate (1613) set the pattern for subsequent Catholic theology. Lessius, who was convinced that atheism by eliminating the eternal judge destroys morals and sound politics, revived Stoic arguments, numerous variations on a theme, which show that the universe is everywhere imprinted with a divine design. Lessius's intent, although he referred only to ancient philosophers, was not to replay the classical battle between the Stoics and the Epicureans but to combat the atheism, silent and disguised in contemporary Europe, that Lessius thought to be the inevitable outcome of the wars of religion and theological fights. Lessius, however, paid scant attention to his own insight... (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the problem of mental causation can be solved by distinguishing between classificatory mental properties, like being a pain, and instances of those properties.Antireductive physicalism allows only that the former be irreducibly mental. Consequently, properties like being a pain cannot have causal commerce with the physical without violating causal closure. But instances of painfulness, according to the token identity thesis, are identical with various physical tokens and can therefore have causal efficacy in the physical world. (...) Since we expect particular mental phenomena, not types or classes of mental phenomena to be involved in causal interactions, it is argued that antireductive physicalism can explain satisfactorily mental causation, despite the protests of Kim, Sosa, Honderich, and others. Being a mental state of a certain sort may have no causal efficacy, but the intentional and phenomenal properties of such states should, if my argument is correct. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Taking Sides: Clashing Views in Death and Dying ed. by William J. Buckley and Karen S. FeldtZoe BernatskyTaking Sides: Clashing Views in Death and Dying Selected, edited, and with introduction by William J. Buckley and Karen S. Feldt new york: mcgraw-hill, 2013. 576 pp. $63.00If you are searching for a textbook that inspires students to think critically by examining diverse positions around contemporary bioethics issues related (...) to death and dying, Taking Sides: Clashing Views in Death and Dying is an engaging and effective learning tool that is well structured and a compelling read. As part of a series of Taking Sides textbooks, this volume examines eighteen issues clustered around seven themes: (1) end-of-life decision making; (2) caregiver end-of-life decision making; (3) treatment requests and decisions regarding pain and futility; (4) assisted suicide; (5) determining definitions of death; (6) hospice, policy, and costs of dying; and (7) dying and death as cultural performances. Units for each theme include an introduction, pro and con arguments, a summary, and a list of additional resources.The book offers a wealth of wisdom through thought-provoking scenarios, forward-looking themes, and scholarly articles. Readers are presented with real-life controversies, such as how depression or advanced directives influence the [End Page 214] end-of-life decision-making process, and how advocates affect the quality of end-of-life care. Other topics covered include the right to effective pain management, the use of palliative sedation for intractable symptoms, and withholding or withdrawing futile treatment including artificial nutrition and hydration. Also debated are concerns surrounding the provision of assisted suicide and the criteria for establishing brain death; issues regarding access to hospice; the impact of identifying with a specific religious orientation; and the reception of culturally competent care.Individuals are often forced abruptly into end-of-life decisions without time for extensive reflection about the meaning of life and death. The weightiness of the outcomes and the intensity of the experience, combined with the apprehension so many of us feel about death and dying, can overwhelm individuals and families. This book promotes thoughtful deliberation about such matters from both professional and personal perspectives. The inclusion of a section on caregiver decision making that highlights compassion fatigue is a unique and valuable contribution to the overall topic. Social, cultural, and religious influences that increase comfort (or pain) in dying patients and the unique experience of grief for those who remain are also given attention.The greatest strength of this text is the “Taking Sides” approach, which introduces the reader to divergent positions on ethical issues. The articles are well selected from recent scholarship and orient readers who may be unfamiliar with medical and ethical terminology and concepts. The presentation of contradictory positions demonstrates the true-to-nature complexity of ethical decisions and inspires the reader to further reflection, and the extensive list of resources provides a rich opportunity for further study. The book is an easy read, and the units and themes can be surveyed independently, making it a helpful resource for introductory courses on moral theology or ethics; a digital “Instructor’s Resources Guide” provides sample questions for academic purposes. Since death and dying is a universal issue, the anticipated audience is extensive.While this text provides an excellent introduction to the ethical dilemmas around death and dying, there are particular areas that are not addressed, such as decision-making in the case of neonates, children, or those with preexisting psychiatric disorders or other disabilities. A valuable addition to the book would have been the presentation of a framework for dealing with the complex challenges of death and dying, such as the virtue ethics framework offered by Lydia Dugdale in the 2015 publication Dying in the Twenty-First Century. But although the book does not add new material to existing debates, the clarity with which it presents each argument will help to orient those less familiar with bioethical issues. [End Page 215]Zoe BernatskyNewman Theological CollegeCopyright © 2016 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:REVIEW SYMPOSIUM 319 secular communities before making up their minds. But, in this case at least, minding theological business requires minding philosophical business. I wish all teachers of the Catholic community would study this book. JAMES J. BUCKLEY Loyola Oollege, Baltimore, Maryland RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY WILLIAM CHRISTIAN'S important new book appears at an opportune moment. It breaks new theoretical ground in the cross-cultural study of religious communities and religious (...) doctrines at a time when this is badly needed. Its contributions could be especially valuable for the burgeoning industry that produces books by Christian theologians on non-Christian religions, since there are signs that this industry is beginning to feed upon itself. Such books (and every year more are published) refer more and more to one another, to previous ' achievements ' in the field, and less and less to the purported object of their study: non-Christian religions themselves. So, in every new addition to the field we find the more-or-less obligatory discussions of Karl Barth's and Hendrik Kraemer's word-centered exclusivism; of Karl Rahner's hierarchical inclusivism; of Wilfred Cantwell Smith's faith-based ·experiential expressivism; and of John Hick's radical theocentric pluralism. There is usually comparatively little discussion of what any non-Christian tradition actually asserts, values, and practices. That is to say, Christian theologians, whose major specialty is theologizing about non-Christian religions, have entered the ·realms of secondary, or even tertiary, processing; they have made the enterprise of theologizing about these religions a purely abstract a priori intra-Christian enterprise, constrained not by the religions themselves, as they impinge upon and make claims upon members of the Christian community, but rather by presuppositions drawn only from some particular reading of the Christian tradition. So Rahner could deduce his theory of " anonymous REVIEW SYMPOSIUM Christians" from a few simple propositions (most importantly, the absoluteness of Christianity and the possibility of the presence of supernatural grace in non-Christian religions), without reference to the actual teachings, practices and values of any non-Christian tradition. The same is largely true for Hick's advocacy of a Copernican revolution in theological thought, and for Barth's rejection of all religion as unbelief. All are a priori positions. William Christian (both in his earlier Oppositions of Religious Doctrines [New York, 1972] and in the new Doctrines of Religious Communities) is one of the few philosophers of religion whose work on the nature of religious doctrines has a direct relevance for Christian thinking about non-Christian religions. It is, moreover, a relevance which, if taken seriously, could provide an agenda for that enterprise which would lift it out of the self-reflexive and largely unproductive agonizing in which it is currently mired. Given that Christian theologizing about non-Christian ;religions is something that neither can nor should be avoided, any work that opens up new avenues is to be welcomed. Christian's Doctrines is thus a potentially important book, and it is the object of this short piece to suggest in what its importance lies and how it is relevant to the Christian enterprise of theologizing about non-Christian religions. First, though, a caveat is in order: Christian's earlier work, with which his new book is directly continuous, has not, to this writer's perception, received the attention it deserves from theologians concerned with these matters. In that earlier work Christian was concerned to lay bare and analyze the logical conditions that must be met before it can properly be said that that two doctrine-expressing sentences contradict or oppose one another, and also to discuss the varieties of opposition that might occur. Oppositions of Religious Doctrines, the work in which he did this, is a book written by a philosopher in a philosophical idiom: it exhibits to a high degree the virtues of conceptual rigor and careful, precise analysis of terms and concepts. Largely for this reason, the work was not attractive to theologians. They are not trained to think in this idiom, and are not easily drawn to works written in it. The work also received comparatively little attention from analyticallytrained philosophers of religion, those who should, by training and taste, find its idiom comfortable... (shrink)

Husserl’s Ideen II, subtitled “Phenomenological Investigations on Constitution” and one of Husserl’s most comprehensive works, encompasses wide-ranging analyses of what Husserl calls “material nature,” “animal nahlre,” and “the spiritual world.” In this paper, I shall reflect briefly on his understanding of the interplay among the notions of person, society, and community Both personal and professional factors contribute to this reflection. Each of us belongs to several different, but interrelated and overlapping, communities. family, circle of friends, departmental colleagues, faculty, college or (...) university community, professional society, and political communities of various levels . The functionings and malfunctionings of some of these communities are themselves sufficient to motivate a reflection on the nature of a well-ordered community. In addition, however, the recent publication of the articles Husserl wrote for the Japanese journal Kaizo on the theme of renewal and his early lectures on ethics and value-theory , along with some of the previously published materials on intersubjectivity —as well as the fine commentaries on Husserl’s ethical writings by writers such as Karl Schuhmann, James Hart, and Philip Buckley —provides new reason to reflect on Husserl’s ethical thought, which is too often dismissed as marginal to his work. (shrink)